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We provide a simple security proof for prepare & measure quantum key distribution protocols
employing noisy processing and one-way postprocessing of the key. This is achieved by showing
that the security of such a protocol is equivalent to that of an associated key distribution protocol
in which, instead of the usual maximally-entangled states, a more general private state is distilled.
Besides a more general target state, the usual entanglement distillation tools are employed (in par-
ticular, Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)-like codes), with the crucial difference that noisy processing
allows some phase errors to be left uncorrected without compromising the privacy of the key.
Entanglement has been the cornerstone of many quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) security proofs to date: A
prepare & measure protocol by which Alice and Bob
generate a secret key can be shown to be secure ex-
actly when an associated entanglement distillation pro-
tocol succeeds in producing a high fidelity maximally-
entangled state. Secrecy of the key then follows since
maximal entanglement can only be shared between two
parties [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The resulting proofs are
intuitive and allow QKD designers to incorporate current
methods of quantum error correction and entanglement
distillation.
Renner, Gisin, and Kraus adopt a more information-
theoretic approach to QKD security with the surprising
result that secure key can be established at noise levels
beyond what seems possible in the entanglement-based
picture [2]. By including a step in which Alice adds noise
to her sifted key the overall key rate can actually increase.
The additional noise damages the correlations held by
Alice and Bob but the key observation is that this noise
may damage Eve’s correlations even more. While the
best known upper bounds for one-way distillable entan-
glement do not rule out the possiblity of distilling EPR
pairs for these noise levels, it is puzzling that this pro-
cessing can generate key at rates well in excess of the
best known entanglement distillation rates [11]. Thus, it
has been unclear whether an entanglement-based security
proof is possible for these protocols.
We find a resolution in the observation of [12] that
maximally-entangled states are not strictly necessary for
generating secret keys. Instead, states leading to secret
keys belong to the class of private states. These are com-
posed of completely correlated systems A and B contain-
ing a uniformly distributed key, along with shield systems
A′ and B′. More precisely, γ is called a d-dimensional pri-
vate state (or pdit) if there are unitaries U (j) and a twist-
ing operator of the form Utwist =
∑
j |jj〉〈jj|AB ⊗U (j)A′B′ ,
such that γ = Utwist (|Φd〉〈Φd|AB ⊗ ρA′B′)U †twist for some
ρA′B′ , where |Φd〉 =
∑d
i=1 |ii〉/
√
d. The twisting oper-
ator ensures that, while Alice and Bob may not share
a maximally entangled state, Eve’s reduced state is in-
dependent of the key. This definition recalls an earlier
result [13] that the secrecy of key created from entangled
systems is not diminished by phase noise in the devices
performing the entanglement distillation.
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FIG. 1: The effective state held by Alice, Bob, and Eve af-
ter noisy processing, where |ϕq〉 = √1−q|0〉+√q|1〉 , |ηuv〉 =P
u,v
√
puv|uv〉 and A′ is the purification of the noise Alice
adds. CSS-like error correction on the AB system is equiva-
lent to classical error correction and privacy amplification on
the key in the prepare & measure protocol, and securely pro-
vides key exactly when it maps many copies of the above state
to a high-fidelity private state for all puv consistent with the
estimated parameters. The shield consists of the A′ systems
together with the CSS code’s syndrome bits held by Bob.
In [14] it was shown that a large number of low fi-
delity copies of a private state can sometimes be distilled
to a high fidelity private state with the same shield but
smaller key system. However, it is not clear what class
of QKD protocols can be coherently recast in the form
considered by [14]. As we will see, the coherent version
of [2]’s protocol is quite different from those of [14]—the
initial adversarially distributed state will be noisy EPR
pairs (with no shield), and the shield of the final private
state arises due to Alice and Bob’s noisy processing.
In the following, we show that a prepare & measure
QKD scheme with noisy processing and one-way post-
processing is secure exactly when an associated pdit dis-
tillation protocol has high fidelity. This requires only
minor modifications of the standard entanglement distil-
lation argument. Indeed, in the coherent description of
the noisy processing protocol the auxiliary system purify-
ing the noise introduced by Alice will function as a shield,
2and the sifted key will become noisy EPR pairs in the key
system of a noisy pdit. The error correction and privacy
amplification required in the classical processing maps to
a CSS-like quantum code on the key system in the co-
herent protocol in the same way as found in [4]. If the
CSS code performs a suitable amount of bit and phase
error correction on the key system, Alice and Bob will be
left with a high fidelity private state. The crucial differ-
ence from previous entanglement-based security proofs is
that Alice and Bob need not correct every phase error to
guarantee security, and this savings will often more than
compensate for the associated increase in the number of
bit errors they must correct. In fact, we can establish key
at bit error rates up to 12.4% for the Bennett-Brassard-84
(BB84) protocol [15] and 14.1% for the six-state proto-
col, matching the rates of [2] and surpassing all previous
thresholds from entanglement-based proofs.
Private State Distillation.—We begin with a coherent
reformulation of the BB84 and six-state protocols [1, 4];
other protocols can be handled in a similar manner [10].
In both cases, Alice first prepares the state |Φ〉AB and
sends the B system to Bob. In BB84 (six-state), each
party then randomly measures in the X or Z basis (X ,
Y , or Z) and by public discussion they sift out those out-
comes corresponding to the same basis choice. This is
equivalent to Alice (Bob) sending a random bit in (mea-
suring in) one of the bases at random, since the statistics
of measurements as well as an eavesdropper Eve’s de-
pendence on their outcomes are identical in both cases.
Alice and Bob then publicly compare a small fraction of
the sifted key to estimate the noise level of the channel.
If the noise level is zero, the resulting length-n sifted
key can be described coherently as |Φ〉⊗n. Otherwise,
the most general noisy channels we need to consider are
Pauli channels, since all subsequent operations will com-
mute with a (hypothetical) measurement in the Bell-basis
which digitizes the actual noise into this form [1, 8]. The
only difference here to the original classicization argu-
ment of Lo and Chau is that Alice flips some key bits,
which also commutes with the Bell-state measurement.
Attributing the noise to Eve, the key state is∑
u,v
√
puv (IA ⊗XuBZvB)|Φ〉⊗nAB|u〉E1 |v〉E2 , (1)
where puv is the probability of error pattern X
uZv de-
scribed by length-n bit strings u and v. Furthermore,
if Alice and Bob randomly permute their n systems, it
is sufficient to consider noise that is independent and
identically-distributed (i.i.d) for each transmitted qubit,
given by rate puv. This follows from a slight variant of
Lemma 3 of [8] (see also [4, 6]), the particulars of which
we take up after the detailed analysis of the next section.
Alice and Bob now distill the key by performing bit
error-correction and privacy amplification (phase error-
correction). Before this, Alice adds i.i.d. noise to A,
randomly applying X at rate q. This is described co-
herently as using an auxiliary system A′ in the state
|ϕ〉A′ =
√
1− q|0〉+√q|1〉 as the control system in a
CNOT gate, yielding the state∑
u,v,f
√
puvqf |f〉A′(X fA ⊗XuBZvB)|Φ〉⊗nAB|u〉E1 |v〉E2 , (2)
where qf = q
|f |(1 − q)n−|f | for length-n bit string f and
|f | its Hamming weight. We can also think of Alice’s
error operator acting on Bob’s system, since X ⊗ XZ
and I⊗XZX have the same effect on |Φ〉.
Now Alice and Bob perform bit error-correction using a
linear error correcting code. This step is the same as the
usual analysis, since all bit errors must be corrected in
the final key. The bit error rate is p˜ = px(1−q)+q(1−px)
for px =
∑
v p1,v, so Alice and Bob must measure nH2(p˜)
parity syndromes, where H2 is the binary Shannon en-
tropy, in order to identify the error pattern with high
probability. To simplify the resulting expressions, we use
the method of decoupling error correction and privacy
amplification [16], itself based on the breeding entangle-
ment distillation protocol [17], whereby syndromes are
collected in auxiliary entangled pairs.
Alice collects the bit parities in her halves of the ancilla
states, measures them, and sends the result to Bob. Bob
then coherently corrects system B and records the error
in an ancilla system B′, producing∑
u,v,f
√
puvqf Z
v
A′ |f〉A′ |u+ f〉B′ZvB|Φ〉⊗nAB|u〉E1 |v〉E2 , (3)
where ZvA′ comes from interchanging X
f
B and Z
v
B.
In the classical description of the protocol, this step re-
quires Alice to encrypt her measurement outcomes with
a one-time pad, preventing information leakage to Eve.
This encryption requires a key, which in the coherent de-
scription is a private state, meaning Alice and Bob gen-
erally collect the parity syndromes in the key subsystems
of private states, not in maximally-entangled states as we
have used. However, there is no loss of generality in using
maximally-entangled states in the formalism, since using
private states raises no additional complications [14, 18].
At this stage, the normal entanglement-based proof
would proceed to correct all phase errors. This would
not give the key rates of [2] as the extra noise would just
reduce the rates from those of [4]. Instead, we come to
the main observation of this paper: not all phase errors
must be corrected. After correcting enough, the resulting
state will be close to a private state.
Examining Alice and Bob’s state makes clear how this
comes about. Tracing out Eve’s systems, they hold
ρ = CA′B′
(∑
u,v
puv[u]B′ [ϕ
v]A′Z
v
B[Φ]
⊗n
ABZ
v
B
)
C†A′B′ ,
(4)
3where [θ] = |θ〉〈θ|, |ϕv〉 = Zv|ϕ〉⊗n, and we have used a
CNOT CA′B′ to write |f〉A′ |u+f〉B′ as CA′B′ |f〉A′ |u〉B′ .
By performing phase error correction at a reduced rate,
the pattern of phase errors will not be uniquely identified,
but only narrowed to a set Vs indexed by the syndrome
s: Vs = {v | syndrome(v) = s}. The key point is that if
the vectors |ϕv〉 for v ∈ Vs were mutually orthogonal, we
could define the unitary DA′B =
∑
v∈Vs
[ϕv]A′ ⊗ZvB and
use UBA′B′ = DA′BCA′B′ to untwist:
ρ′ = UBA′B′ρU
†
BA′B′
= [Φ]⊗nAB ⊗
(∑
u
pu[u]B′
∑
v∈Vs
pv|u [ϕ
v]A′
)
. (5)
Since D is a controlled-Z gate, either system can be
thought of as the control, so DA′B =
∑
j U
(j)
A′ ⊗ [j]B for
some unitaries U (j). UBA′B′ is a twisting operation, so
that Alice and Bob would share a private state. Keys
derived from this state would be secret.
Detailed Analysis.—To establish the secrecy of keys
generated from ρ, recall the univerally-composable defini-
tion of security from [19, 20]. A key K is called ǫ-secure
if the state ρKE of the key and eavesdropper satisfies
||ρKE − κ⊗ ρE ||1 ≤ 2ǫ, where κ is a uniform mixture of
all key values, shared by Alice and Bob. The latter state
is a perfect key and this definition ensures that ρKE can
safely be used for any further cryptographic purpose.
In the present context, the key is created by measuring
systems A and B of ρ in the Z basis. As the untwist-
ing operation is unitary and commutes with the measure-
ment, whether it is performed before the measurement or
after does not affect the key’s security. When perform-
ing the untwisting operation on the unmeasured state
results in a maximally-entangled state on AB, the key
generated will be perfectly secure. Similarly, if there is
an untwisting operation mapping AB to within 2ǫ of a
maximally-entangled state, the key is ǫ-secure [12].
For simplicity we consider independent amplitude and
phase errors, with the case of correlated u and v follow-
ing along similar lines. To construct an untwisting oper-
ation, it suffices to find a rank-one POVM with elements
Ev that can distinguish the |ϕv〉 with average error Pe no
larger than ǫ2/2: Pe = 〈Pve 〉 =
∑
v,v′ 6=v pv〈ϕv|Ev′ |ϕv〉 ≤
ǫ2/2, where Pve is probability of decoding input state |ϕv〉
incorrectly. This problem was considered by [21] in the
context of transmitting classical information over a quan-
tum channel. Letting σ = (1 − pz)|ϕ〉〈ϕ| + pzZ|ϕ〉〈ϕ|Z,
pz =
∑
u pu1, and S(σ) be the entropy of σ, their results
imply that with probability 1 − ǫ2/2, the elements of a
randomly-chosen subset Vs ⊂ V of size 2n(S(σ)−δ) can be
distinguished by the pretty-good measurement (PGM)
with average error probability ǫ2/2, where ǫ decreases
exponentially with n for arbitrarily small positive δ.
The PGM has rank-one elements by construction [22],
so we have Ev = |θ˜v〉〈θ˜v| for unnormalized |θ˜v〉. Then
we can append another auxiliary system A′′ and con-
sider the Neumark extension consisting of orthonormal
states |θv〉A′A′′ in the joint Hilbert space A′A′′ such
that A′A′′〈θv|ϕv′〉A′ |0〉A′′ = A′〈θ˜v|ϕv〉A′ [23]. With
this, we can finally construct the untwisting operator
U = (
∑
v[θ
v]A′A′′ ⊗ ZvB)C†A′B′ .
Letting ρ˜ = |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ, the fidelity of Uρ˜U † with
ρ′ = [Φ]⊗nAB ⊗
∑
u,v pu,v[θ
v]A′A′′ ⊗ [u]B′ is given by
F (Uρ˜U †, ρ′) =
∑
u,v puv |〈ϕv|θ˜v〉| = 〈
√
Pvs 〉, where Pvs
is the conditional probability of successful transmission
of v. Since 〈√Pvs 〉 ≥ 〈Pvs 〉 = 1 − Pe ≥ 1 − ǫ2/2, using
the relation between trace norm and fidelity [24], we find
||Uρ˜U † − ρ′||1 ≤ 2
√
1− F 2 ≤ 2ǫ, proving ǫ-security.
A subtlety arises in the use of the Neumark extension
in that our untwisting operation consists of controlled
isometries rather than unitaries. However, the privacy of
the key is uncompromised: while Eve may have knowl-
edge of the shield system, as long as Alice and Bob hold
the key and shield, the fact that they could be untwisted
implies that Eve is ignorant of the key.
Above, we took u and v to be independent. If they are
not, randomly choosing sets Vs of size 2n(S(σ|u)−). , where
S(σ|u) is the conditional entropy of σ given u, leads to
an exponentially small average probability of decoding
error for the PGM, and the rest of the argument remains
unchanged[5]. Putting this all together, by using a ran-
dom code Alice and Bob can select a subset Vs of size
≈ 2nS(σ|u). With probability exponentially close to one,
the untwisting operation can be constructed from the
pretty-good measurement, ensuring the key is ǫ-secure.
Finally, we must consider the effects of non-i.i.d. noise,
e.g. arising from a coherent eavesdropping attack. By
random sampling Alice and Bob obtain an estimate f estu,v
of the fraction, or type, of Pauli errors XuZv. Since the
raw key bits are permutation-invariant, |f estu,v−f trueu,v | ≤ ε
with probability exponentially close (in n) to unity [25].
This allows us to prove that the above procedure is
secure for any input state yielding estimate f estu,v, not
just those subjected to i.i.d. noise. First decompose
the squared fidelity for an i.i.d. input state with er-
ror rate pu,v=f
est
u,v into a sum over possible types f :
F 2 =
∑
f prob(f |p=f est)F 2f , where prob(f |p=f est) is the
probability of type f in the i.i.d. distribution, Ff is the
fidelity our protocol produces on a uniform distribution
over errors of type f , and we have suppressed the u, v
indices. Since there are only polynomially many types,
all those with nonnegligible probability must have poly-
nomially large probability and thus corresponding fideli-
ties Ff which are exponentially close to one. Since types
within ε of the rate p are among the probable types [26],
this guarantees that the above procedure produces high-
fidelity entangled output states (or securely aborts) for
any input state yielding f est.
Achievable Key Rates.—What key generation rates can
be achieved by the protocols considered above? The
4bit-error correction step consumes nH2(p˜) previously-
established secret key bits, but in so doing produces n
bit-error-free bits. The phase error correction must re-
duce the number of phase errors from 2nH(v|u) to 2nS(σ|u)
(which can be accomplished by a random phase code with
n(H(v|u) − S(σ|u)) syndrome bits) in order to ensure
that Alice and Bob could untwist the state, so we find an
overall rate of 1−H2(p˜)− (H(v|u)− S(σ|u)), or
R = 1−H2(p˜)−
∑
u
pu
(
H2(p1|u)−H2(λ+u )
)
, (6)
where λ+u =
1
2 (1 +
√
1− 16q(1− q)p1|u(1− p1|u)) is the
larger eigenvalue of σu = (1− p1|u)|ϕ〉〈ϕ|+ p1|uZ|ϕ〉〈ϕ|Z.
In the BB84 protocol, bit and phase errors are equal
but uncorrelated, meaning p1|u = pz = px = p1|v, from
which we find an error threshold of 12.4% by letting q →
1/2. In the six-state protocol all Pauli errors occur at
the same rate, giving a threshold error rate of 14.1%.
Discussion—We have shown that one-way key distri-
bution protocols employing noisy processing can be seen
as distillation protocols for private states where the pu-
rification of the added noise functions as part of the shield
and the error correction and privacy amplification steps
map to a CSS code in the usual way. This extends the en-
tanglement distillation paradigm initiated in [1, 4], pro-
viding a cleaner and less technical security proof for the
protocols of [2]. Further, by formulating the protocol in
this way, we gain insight into the mechanism by which
addition of noise improves key rates, namely by deflect-
ing Eve’s correlations with Alice and Bob to the shield
and away from the key.
In the security proof of the six-state protocol [5],
building on the work of [27], Lo showed that a degen-
erate error-correcting code could be used to improve
the threshold error rate from 12.6% to 12.7%. Further
progress in this direction can be found in [28], where we
report on the combination of that method with the noisy
processing studied here, showing that the threshold error
rate of BB84 can be increased from 12.4% to 12.9%. We
believe our findings will point towards new methods of
key distillation and analagous methods of private state
distillation, furthering the fruitful exchange between pri-
vacy amplification and entanglement distillation.
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